In 2008, Tang and Wu designed a one-time alias mechanism for protecting the mobile privacy of a user.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the dramatic and con tinuous increase of e-commerce transactions. E commerce makes it easier for a service provider to get and collect users' personal information. Privacy is one of the major concerns of users when exchang ing information through a network. In a roaming en vironment, it's important to provide a secure way to simultaneously protect the interests of both the ser vice provider and the users and thereby establish a trust relationship.
To meet the challenge of providing access con trol for a content provider and privacy protection for users, several authentication schemes have been pro posed for roaming service (Lee, 2005) , (Tang, 2008a) , (Tang, 2008b) . In 2005, Lee and Yeh (Lee, 2005) proposed a delegation-based authentication (DBA) protocol for the use in portable communication sys tem. Tang and Wu designed a possible attack to Lee Yeh's scheme in (Tang, 2008a) , and then proposed a scheme of protecting mobile privacy in wireless net works (Tang, 2008b) . Recently, Youn and Lim (Youn, 2010) showed that the protocol in (Lee, 2005 ) cannot achieve private roaming service. They then presented an improved protocol to fix the problem.
In Tan-Wu's scheme (Tang, 2008b) , authors de signed a one-time alias mechanism for various lev els of privacy protection. A new alias was generated by hashing either the previous used alias or the user identity. In this article, we show that Tan-Wu's pro tocol cannot provide the mobile privacy for a roaming user since the aliases of the user fails to achieve the unlinkability. We remedy this situation by sug gesting an enhanced protocol that utilizes a pseudo random function(PRF). We also demonstrate how the enhanced protocol is more efficient compared to the implementation in (Youn, 2010) .
2 REVIEW OF TANG-WU'S SCHEME 2.1 Description In 2008, Tan and Wu proposed a mutual authen tication scheme for mobile communications (Tang, 2008b) , which is briefly described below. First, the notation used in the scheme is defined as follows. Let G be a cyclic additive group with generator T, p is the largest prime factor of the order of T, h : Z; >--+ Z; be a collision-resistant hash function, and IT : G >--+ Z; be a point representation function. The symbol '�' de notes a point addition operator in G, and [X]K denotes encrypting a message X with a key K using a symmet ric encryption algorithm. We assume that lO Y and IDH be the identities ofYLR and HLR, respectively.
HLR has a private/public key pair (x, Y), where x E Z; is a random number, and Y = xT
The scheme in (Tang, 2008b) consists of two pro tocols:TDI and EMA. TDI is described below.
Step (2). HLR sets key usage restrictions in mw, and generates a random number K, and computes r = (h(IDMAlmw)T) ltJ (KT) and a = -xh(ll(r)) Kmodp for a mobile station MS. Afterwards, (IOMA,mw, r) is published, while (IOMA,a) is stored in HLR's database and (a, mw) is sent to MS via a secure channel.
Step (3). If h(IOMAlmw)T = (aT) ltJ (h(ll(r))Y) ltJ r, MS accepts the delegation key a.
There are three parties involved in EMA: MS, VLR, and HLR. Suppose there is a secure channel to protect the traffic between VLR and HLR, and K(V. H) is their share key. Three parties perform the following steps:
Step (1). MS randomly generates a communica tion key ck and two numbers nonce and K, and computes C = [ck,ts, Texp,noncelo, R = kT and s = -kh(ll(R) Inonce) + amodp. Here, ts is the current timestamp, and nonce is a nonce. ck is only valid for a certain time length Texp . Then, MS sends Sl = {R,s,IDH,mw,C,nonce} to VLR.
Step (2). After receiving Sl, VLR checks the war rant mw for restrictions, and authenticates MS by us ing the attached digital signature (R,s). If both are true, VLR sends a request S2 = {IDMA,C} to HLR.
Step (3). HLR first searches the corresponding a in its database according to IOMA, then decrypts C to obtain ck, ts, Texp and nonce. If ck is valid, HLR provides strong mobile privacy for MS by perform ing the following three tasks: (a) generation of new alias IOMA = h(IOX) E Z;, where lOX be the pre vious used alias or 10M; (b) substitution of dele gation key cr' for a and public information r' for r, where r' = (h(IDMAlmw)T) ltJ (K'T) and a = -xh(ll(r')) -K'modp for a random number K'; and Step (4). Receiving the response {CV,H, [TV,Mlo} from HLR, VLR decrypts CV,H, and check the validity not only for ck that isn't an expired key, but also for nonce that is equal to the one in Step (2 
Mobile Privacy of Users in EMA
The mobile privacy of a user can be disclosed by using the tracking and activity recognition when a link be tween the requests from the user exists. Suppose that the service-region is divided into n areas and MS vis its them in the following order: Al --+ A2 --+ ... --+ An.
There are n service providers. Each service provider VLR; is responsible for one area A;, 1 -s: i -s: n. A re quest Sl (1;) for a service item 1; is generated in the area Ai by MS and is sent to the VLR; through a wire less channel. Using a pseudonym technique, MS is able to interact with the system without revealing his identity. However, an attacker can track the unique pseudonym. This problem can be addressed with a one-time alias technique for MS. The one time alias IDMA; is used by MS to transmit the request mes sages Sl (1;) to VLR;. If a link between these requests is obtained by some means, an attacker can take action to track MS's moving history and current location.
There is a link between one-time aliases of MS in (Tang, 2008b) . As describe in (Tang, 2008b , page 1040, line 15), a new alias of MS is simply IOMA=h(IOX), where lOX be the previous used alias or 10M. In the first request Sl (h), there isn't any previous used alias for MS. The first alias in Sl(h) can be computed as IDMA 1 =h(IDM). Af ter the first request, MS computes the one-time alias IOMA;=h(IOX) in Sl (I;), where lOX E Gi-l ={IOM, IDMA 1 , "', IDMA;-d, and 2 -s: i -s: n. For a given set Q, we denote {h(e)le E Q} as h(Q). The above process may be regarded as selecting an element IOMA; from the set h(G;-l)={h(e) le E G;-J}. Note that Gl={IDM,h(IDM)} and G;=G;-l U {IDMA;}. Since IOMA; E h(G;-l), we have G;r;;;.( G;-l U h(Gi-l)).
Thus, G2C;:{IOM,h(IOM),h 2 (IOM)} using Gl ={IDM, h(IDM)}, and G 3 c;: {IDM, h(IDM) , h 2 (IDM) , h 3 (IDM)} using the result of G2, and so on. Each set G;-l can be represented as a subset of Di-l ={IDM, h(IDM),··· , H -1 (IDM)}, and thereby h(Gi-l) C;; h(Di-l). We
is a subset of h(Dn-l), so that when IDMA; is chosen by MS from h(Gi-J), it belongs to h(Dn-l). However, the elements in h( Dn-l) form a hash chain that can be gener ated by the seed h(IDM). For each MS's alias couple (TDMAi-l, TDMAi), there exists an inte ger I E Zn-l such as IDMAi=h'(IDMAi-l) or IDMAi-l =h z (IDMAi). Hence, an attacker can link two different aliases of MS, and conclude that MS visits areas (from Ai-l to Ai) in consecutive order.
Let IDMA be the current alias of MS and assume that F is taken from a pseudorandom function (PRF). For the unlinkability, an alias of MS is derived from F with delegation key cr and input IDMA and output of the appropriate length for the subsequent authentica tion. HLR generates a new delegation key pair (a ' , r') for each new alias IDMA', and transmits a ' to MS in a secure way. Then MS and HLR store (IDMA', 0') in stead of (IDMA,cr). They use the updated delegation key pair for a new authentication.
Description of Enhanced Protocol
Since the setup procedure is the same as TDI pro posed in (Tang, 2008b) , we only describe the efficient mutual authentication (EMA) procedure as shown in Fig. 1 . Let I be an integer representing the length of an alias and 'Bz(m) denote the first I bits of binary string m. For each execution of EM A protocol , three parties perform the following steps:
Step ( Step (2). After receiving SI, VLR checks the war rant mw for restrictions, and authenticates MS by us ing the attached digital signature (R, s). If both are true, VLR sends a request S2={IDMA,C} to HLR. Otherwise, VLR rejects MS's request.
Step (3). HLR retrieves cr according to IDMA, and decrypts C to obtain ck, ts, Texp, IDV, Nand IDMA'.
Then, HLR verifies if IDV is identical to the iden tity of sender in
Step (2) Step (4). Receiving the response {CV.H, [TVMlcr} from HLR, VLR decrypts CV,H, and checks the va lidity not only for ck that isn't an expired key, but also for N that is equal to the one in Step (2). If it is true, VLR computes [IDV,N, [Tv.Mlcrlck and sends it to MS.
Step (5) We analyze the security provided by the enhanced protocol. As the basic requirements on mobile au thentication in (Tang, 2008b) are entirely preserved, the associated security properties hold true here as well and we will not repeat them. The enhanced protocol does not suffer from the ailments of tradi tional pseudonymous authentication protocols. At tacks such as DOS attack to HLR or the privacy disclosure of requests described in Section 2.2 are avoided. ln the following, we only discuss the en hanced security features of the proposed scheme: Unlinkability. We now analyze the unlinkability of enhanced protocol in terms of the various parts of the request message Sl (I). Recall that IDMA is the out put of PRF F and C is the output of an IND-CCA secure symmetric encryption scheme. Due to the in distinguishability property of a PRF F, it is computa tionally infeasible to distinguish between IDMA and a random value in {O, I} I . The probability of suc cess for an attacker to distinguish between C and a random element in the ciphertext space is negligible under the IND-CCA assumption (Bellare, 1997) . The nonce N is randomly selected from Z;. At the same time, MS runs a secure digital signature scheme in (NIST, 2009) to generate Siga(N) for a service item 1, giving one-time cr and (IDMA, r, mw ) . It is also straightforward to show that events £1 and £2 oc cur with negligible probability, where £1 is the event that a HLR-generated verification key (IDMA, r, mw ) is used more than once, and £2 is the event that an attacker forges a new, valid message/signature pair with respect to any HLR-generated verification key. We have assumed that the probability of deriving MS identity information from its associated delega tion constraint information mw is negligible. The part "IDH" is used to point to the end of the ciphertext C. Therefore, an attacker can't find a link of part in Sl (1) with the past. An attacker hasn't the power to impersonate HLR while communicating with VLR and to impersonate VLR while communicating with HLR, since neither the long-term secret key K(V, H) nor a valid IDV in C is possessed. Hence, while communicating with HLR, an attacker can neither generate the valid messages in step (2) to guarantee that the matching of I DV is done in a consistent way. At the same time, the lack of key K(V, H) implies that it can not decrypt the response CV, H. Likewise, she/he generate the responding con firmation CV, H while communicating with VLR.
MS and its HLR can authenticate their messages so that an attacker cannot impersonate them any more.
Since the delegation key cr is unknown to the at tacker, and she/he cannot generate a valid cipher text C=[ ck,ts,Texp, TDV,N, TDMA'k Here, TDMA' ='B I (F(cr, IDMA)), and ts and N are generated by M.
Similarly, the attacker can neither generate the re sponding confirmation [ Tv, M] a.
Replay Attacks and DoS Attacks. In DoS attacks, the attackers may flood a large number of illegal ac cess requests to the HLR. Their aim is to consume critical resources in the HLR. By exhausting these critical resources, the attacker can prevent the HLR from serving legitimate users. In HLR-online authen tication, for every access request Sl (I) from all users that have registered in the HLR, HLR has to perform two decryption operations and check the validity of the requesters. These can easily be exploited by the attacker.
The basic idea as adopted in (Tang, 2008a) is to use a proxy signature along with mobile authenti cation. HLR performs a mobile authentication only when the proxy signature can be verified by a VLR.
The following steps describe the proxy signature verification procedure performed by a VLR. For each request Sl (!) that is received, extract the nonce Nand its signature Siga(N)=(R,s). VLR verifies this value Siga(N) with the corresponding verification informa tion (IDM, r, mw ) of MS, then Sl (1) is considered to be legitimate if (sT) t±J (h(IT(R) I N)R) = r. Otherwise, the request is illegitimate. Then, VLR construct a re quest message S2 = {IDMA, C} for legitimate Sl (1), and send it to the HLR. Thus, it is difficult for an at tacker to launch an effective DoS attack to HLR.
Furthermore, we make use of the nonce N to pre vent replay attacks. Thus, our solution does not suffer from this attacks. We also compare our scheme to other contributory mobile authentication schemes including the schemes in (Lee, 2005; Tang, 2008b; Youn, 2010) . Table I summarizes the security properties of four schemes.
The security properties against unlinkability, imper sonation attacks, mobile DoS attacks to HLR, replay attacks, and session key agreement are are denoted as: SP I , SP2, SP3, SP4 and SPs, respectively.
Tang and Wu (Tang, 2008a) showed that Lee-Yeh scheme in (Lee, 200S) suffers from an impersonated HLR attack such that the session key is compromised. Lu and Zhou (Lu, 20 I 0) described a dishonest VLR' for Tang-Wu (Tang, 2008a) scheme to obtain the com munication key generated by MS. The above compar isons show that our scheme and provides the strongest security protection.
Performance
The storage and the computation and communication in the enhanced protocol are about the same costs as that in the scheme (Tang, 2008b) . No computation cost needs to be added by MS, except the additional communication cost 2/. Our protocol uses overall structure similar to a re cent protocol (Youn, 2010), but our design is more efficient than theirs. Table 2 shows the computa tion costs of both protocols. The time used to per form a symmetric encryption operation is negligible compared with the time needed to execute a public key computation. Thus, Our computation cost is al most identical to Youn-Lim's. Table 3 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we showed that Tan-Wu scheme (Tang, 2008b) doesn't provide the protection of mobile pri- vacy III roaming servIces. We also proposes an enhanced delegation-based authentication protocol. Compared to Youn-Lim's protocol in (Youn, 2010), our design is more efficient than theirs.
